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1 Introduction
This paper studies a new mechanism to finance innovation: seigniorage. Seigniorage
allows the developer of an open-source blockchain-based software to earn a direct
financial reward (in addition to indirect benefits derived from, for example, career
concerns) via the creation of a token—itself a piece of open-source software—that
must be used in conjunction with the software.
To illustrate, consider a population of agents who wish to exchange either a good
or a service, but are prevented from doing so by the lack of required infrastructure.
If this exchange can occur in electronic form, then the missing infrastructure may be
a protocol, that is, the technical specifications governing the communication between
machines. A developer who creates the missing protocol can profit from his innova-
tion by simultaneously creating a token, and by establishing that all exchanges that
occur using the protocol must use this token.1 The developer owns the initial stock
of tokens so that, if the protocol is successful, there will be a positive demand for
tokens, a positive price for tokens and positive profits earned by the developer.2
Blockchain enables this mechanism in three ways (see Section 1.1 for additional
details on blockchain). First, it allows the developer to commit to a specific supply
of tokens. Absent this commitment, because the marginal cost of creating electronic
tokens is zero, the only possible equilibrium price for tokens is zero, leading to
zero profits for the entrepreneur. Using blockchain technology, instead, the rules
determining whether (and how) the supply of tokens increases over time can initially
be specified within the software. If the software is open source, this commitment
is credible because anybody can verify the software’s source code.3 Furthermore,
blockchain can be used to specify that only a given token can be used to transact
1 Prices could be expressed in fiat currency (that is, in some numeraire). The important point
is that they need to be settled using the token.
2 Alfred Wenger, a prominent venture capitalist, provides one of the first descriptions of
this mechanism: “You can think of these [tokens] like the tokens you might buy at a fair
to get on a ride: different operators can have their own rides and set their own price in
terms of tokens. You only need to buy tokens once (in exchange for fiat currency) and
then can use them throughout the fair.” See https://continuations.com/post/148098927445/
crypto-tokens-and-the-coming-age-of-protocol.
3 This implies that the development of a closed-source protocol cannot be financed via seignior-
age, but only via a set of fees/prices (see Section 5.1 for a discussion).
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using the protocol.4 Finally, blockchain may be used to create the protocol.
This paper studies the incentives for innovation generated by seigniorage. I
build a model in which, in every period, a developer exerts effort and invests in the
development of a protocol. Initially, the developer owns the entire stock of tokens,
and can sell some to investors via an Initial Coin Offering (ICO), modeled as an
auction. Subsequently, in every period, he can sell or buy tokens on a frictionless
market for tokens in which both users of the protocol and investors are active.
The developer can use the proceedings of the sale of tokens to either invest in the
development of the protocol or to consume.
The first result of the paper is that, if investors are price takers, then in any post-
ICO period there is an anti-coordination problem. If investors expect the developer
to develop the software in the future, this expectation should be priced into the
token’s current price. But if this is the case, then the developer is strictly better off
by selling all of his tokens, which allows him to “cash in” on future developments
without doing any work. On the other hand, if investors expect no development to
occur, the price of the token will be low. The developer should hold onto as many
tokens as possible, exert effort and invest in the development of the protocol, so
to increase the future price of the token. In every post-ICO period, therefore, the
equilibrium is in mixed strategy: the price of the token is such that the developer
is indifferent between selling all of his tokens (and therefore not developing the
protocol) or keeping a strictly positive amount of tokens (and therefore continuing
the development of the protocol). The developer randomizes between these two
options, in a way that leaves investors indifferent between purchasing tokens in any
given period.
The equilibrium at ICO is instead in pure strategies. The important point is that,
if the ICO is an auction, then the fraction of the total stock of tokens sold to investors
is announced initially. Because the fraction kept by the developer determines his
incentives to exert effort and invest in the development of the protocol, investors
can anticipate the amount of development that will occur in the period following
the ICO.
4 Of course, it is always possible to modify the source code to accept a different token, therefore
creating a “fork”: a new protocol, with its own development, incompatible with the initial protocol.
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In addition, both at ICO and post-ICO there may be multiple equilibria. Be-
cause of a cash constraint, the developer cannot invest in the development of the
protocol more than his assets. It follows that the developer may sell some of his
tokens, as a way of accumulating assets to finance the future development of the
protocol. The number of tokens that the developer needs to sell in order to finance
future investments depends on the current price for tokens, therefore generating a
coordination problem. If the price is high, the developer needs to sell fewer tokens,
and his incentives to invest and develop the software in the future are high. This,
in turn, justifies the high price for tokens today. If instead the price today is low, in
order to finance future development, the developer needs to sell more tokens. But
then his incentives to develop the software will be low, which justifies the fact that
the price is low today. Therefore, at ICO there could be multiple pure-strategy Nash
equilibria, while post-ICO there could be multiple mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.5
When choosing whether and when to hold an ICO, the developer is therefore
facing a tradeoff. If he holds an ICO, in every subsequent period with positive
probability he will sell all of his tokens and not develop the software. Postponing
the ICO, therefore, prevents the creation of a market for tokens and works as a
commitment device, because the developer will hold all of his tokens for certain and
set the corresponding level of effort and investment. However, if the developer does
not sell tokens at ICO, he may lack the funds to invest in the development of the
protocol. As a consequence, the developer never wants to hold an ICO if his own
assets are sufficient to finance the optimum level of investment in the development
of the protocol, but may hold the ICO otherwise.
The equilibrium of the game is, in general, not efficient. The first source of
inefficiency is that, as already discussed, the developer may need to sell some to-
kens to finance the development of the protocol, but doing so implies that in every
subsequent period he will develop the protocol with probability less then one. But
even assuming that the developer has sufficient funds to invest optimally, there is
5 Clearly, if there are network effects, then there is an additional coordination problem: for a
given sequence of effort and investment by the developer, there is a coordination problem among
users, possibly leading to the existence of a “high adoption” and a “low adoption” equilibrium. The
novelty here is that, for a given adoption equilibrium, there are multiple equilibrium sequences of
effort and investment arising from a coordination problem between investors and the developer.
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a second, more subtle, source of inefficiency. The developer’s level of effort and
investment are set so as to maximize the value of his stock of tokens. This value de-
pends on the volume of the transaction occurring using the protocol during a given
period of time.6 Instead, in the first best, effort and investment should be set so as
to maximize the present discounted value of the surplus generated by the protocol.
That is, the fact that the protocol will be used and generate surplus over multiple
periods is completely disregarded by the developer.
Furthermore, the fraction of tokens held by investors determines the sensitivity of
the price of tokens to changes in the developer’s effort and investment, and therefore
whether the equilibrium level of effort and investment is above or below the efficient
level. Back-of-the envelope calculations using data from the Ethereum blockchain
suggest that, conditional on exerting positive effort, the equilibrium level of effort
and investment is above the welfare-maximizing level. This is due to the fact that,
at present, only a small fraction of tokens is used by users, with the vast majority
being held by investors, which implies a very high sensitivity of the price of token
to the developer’s effort and investment.7
1.1 Blockchain-based protocols
The key premise of this paper is that blockchain can be the technological foundation
of various other protocols. To illustrate this fact, it is useful to make an analogy
between blockchain and the Internet Protocol Suite.
The Internet Protocol Suite (commonly known as TCP/IP) was developed in the
late ’60s and early ’70s to allow for the decentralised transmission of data, that is,
transmission of data via a network of computers in which no node is, individually,
essential for the well functioning of the network. Financed by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), it had the goal of increasing military commu-
6 This will result from an application of the equation of exchange, usually employed to link a
country’s price level, real GDP, money supply and velocity of money.
7 This result is subject to many caveats. The main one is that over- or under-provision of effort
and investment should emerge as a function of the fraction of tokens held by investors in the
long run, that is, when the software is mature and all major developments stop. Arguably, no
blockchain project has yet reached this stage. I will argue that, at present, the best candidate for
such an analysis is Ethereum, because among the oldest and better established projects, it is the
one in which it is easier to identify the fraction of tokens used vs kept by investors.
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nication resilience by moving from a hub-and-spoke model of communication to a
complete (or mesh) network model of communication (see Figure 1).8 The Internet
Protocol Suite is the technological foundation of a second set of protocols, also called
application layer protocols. Those protocols make use of TCP/IP to handle specific
types of data in a specific context: HTTP for accessing web pages; SMTP, POP,
and IMAP for sending and receiving emails; FTP for sending receiving files; and so
on.
Fig. 1: Hub-and-spoke (left) and mesh (right)
Blockchain further expands the possible operations that can be performed by
a network of computers in which no node is essential. Like TCP/IP, it allows for
the decentralized transmission of data, but also permits the decentralized storage,
verification and manipulation of data.9 Blockchain is also similar to TCP/IP in that
it provides the foundation for a number of other protocols. The most well-known is
the Bitcoin protocol: a protocol allowing a network of computers to store data (how
many Bitcoins each address owns), and to enforce specific rules regarding how these
data can be manipulated (no double spending). The Bitcoin protocol is not only the
oldest and most widely known application of blockchain technology, but also well
illustrates an important point: absent blockchain technology, the same type of data
can be maintained only within a traditional organization (typically a bank).
8 See Hafner and Lyon (1998), in particular the description of the work of Paul Baran (pp 53-64).
9 Occasionally a distinction is made between blockchain and decentralized ledger technologies,
where blockchain refers to a specific way of maintaining a decentralized ledger. This distinction is
not relevant for the purpose of this paper. Another distinction is between “blockchain” meaning
the technology, and “the blockchain” meaning a specific application of the blockchain technology,
usually the Bitcoin blockchain.
1 Introduction 7
Numerous other open-source blockchain-based protocols currently exist or are
actively being developed. In addition to several cryptocurrencies (such as Monero,
ZCash, Litecoin), there are protocols for building decentralized computing platforms
that can run any application or software (see Ethereum, EOS, Cardano, NEO);10
protocols for decentralized real-time gross settlement (see Ripple, Stellar); proto-
cols enabling the creation of decentralized marketplaces for storage and hosting of
files (see SIA, Filecoin, Storj), for renting in/out CPU cycles (see Golem), for event
or concert tickets (see Aventus), for e-books (see Publica); protocols for generic
e-commerce transactions (see Openbazaar); protocols creating fully decentralized
prediction markets (see Augur, Gnosis), financial exchanges (see 0xproject), and
financial derivatives (see MakerDAO); protocols allowing the existence of fully de-
centralized organizations (see Aragon) and virtual worlds (see Decentraland); and
many more.11
1.2 Blockchain and Seigniorage
An important difference between the protocols built on TCP/IP and those built on
blockchain is the way in which their developers are rewarded. The vast majority of
protocols based on TCP/IP are open source, free to adopt and use. The contributors
to these projects are not organized in a single, traditional company, but rather form
a loosely-defined group around one (or multiple) project leader(s) and are based
on open collaboration (as is typical of open source projects). They do not receive
immediate, direct financial compensation for their contributions, and are motivated
by career concerns (i.e., to increase their reputation and reap financial benefits
in the future) and by non-monetary considerations (i.e., the pleasure of sharing,
collaborating and contributing to a public good).
Instead, as already discussed in the Introduction, the development of blockchain-
based protocols can leverage financial incentives via seigniorage. This is possible
10 Decentralized computing platforms can also be seen as an operating system running over a
network of computers rather than a single machine. Developers can then create software (which in
this context are smart contracts) that is executed by the network rather than by a single machine.
11 To my knowledge, the vast majority of blockchain projects are (or plan to be) open-source
protocols, with only few exceptions, such as Iota (a protocol that is not fully open source) and
Binance Coin (a token that works as a “voucher” to access Binance, a traditional exchange).
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whenever the protocol must be used in conjunction with a token. In case of protocols
creating decentralized marketplaces, the token is typically the currency used by the
two sides of the market. In blockchain projects without this “marketplace” element,
the use of the token can vary. For example, in the case of cryptocurrencies such as
Bitcoin, there are two types of users: people who need to exchange Bitcoins, and
those who use their computers to process these transactions, also called miners. The
first “pays” the second in two ways. One is direct: the sender of bitcoins can pay
a fee to process the transaction faster, and this fee is earned by the miner. The
second is indirect: the network awards miners with new bitcoins for their work.
Because of its effect on the price, this increase in the supply of bitcoins amounts to
a transfer from the holders of bitcoins to the miners.12 A similar mechanism is used
within decentralized computing platforms such as Ethereum, with the difference that
miners do not only process transactions, but can perform any arbitrary operation
on the data contained in the ledger.
The most visible part of seigniorage is the Initial Coin Offering (ICO), where the
developer sells tokens to investors and users for the first time. The first notable ICO
was that of Ethereum in 2014, raising USD 2.3 million in approximately 12 hours.
In a recent report, PwC estimates that in 2017 there were 552 ICOs raising a total
of USD 7 billion (Diemers et al., 2018). The same report notes that the figures for
2018 are likely to be much larger: in the first five months of 2018 alone there were
537 ICOs raising USD 13.7 billion. For comparison, in 2016 total Venture Capital
investment was USD 66.6 billion in the US and USD 4.7 billion in Europe (OECD,
2017). Interestingly, some analysts claim that about half of the ICOs launched in
2017 had already failed by early 2018.13
The less visible part of seigniorage is the sale on the open market of tokens
that were not sold at ICO. With few exceptions,14 either the sale of tokens on the
open market is not disclosed, or it is discussed only within blog posts and informal
communication.15 More visible is the practice of rewarding suppliers using tokens.
12 See also Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi (2017).
13 See http://fortune.com/2018/02/25/cryptocurrency-ico-collapse/.
14 For example, Ripple announces in advance a schedule for selling parts of its XRP stock, see
https://ripple.com/insights/q1-2018-xrp-markets-report/.
15 For example, see this blog post by the Ethereum foundation https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/
01/07/2394/.
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This is often referred to as “bug bounty programs” by which translators, coders, and
marketers receive tokens for their work.
Despite this difference in visibility, recent work by Howell, Niessner, and Yermack
(2018) and Amsden and Schweizer (2018) show that projects that go through an
ICO sell only about half of their tokens at ICO, with the rest being kept by the
founding team.16 This indicates that for projects that go through an ICO, the two
sides of seigniorage—the sale of tokens at ICO and the sale of tokens post-ICO—are
comparable in terms of the number of tokens sold (or that are expected to be sold).
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for some projects to skip the ICO stage and only
sell tokens on the market, in a practice known as “airdrop”. This is typically the
case for forks (i.e., derivations) of other projects, such as Stellar (a fork of Ripple
and currently the sixth most valuable blockchain project by market capitalization),
Bitcoin cash and Bitcoin Gold (forks of Bitcoin).17
1.3 Relevant literature
This paper contributes to the literature on innovation and incentives, in particular to
the literature studying the motivation behind contributions to open-source software
(see the seminal paper by Lerner and Tirole, 2002). In this respect, I show that
open source—with its organizational structure and ethos—can coexist with strong
financial incentives. Of course, an open question not addressed here is whether or
not financial rewards will crowd out other motives (see, for example, Benabou and
16 More precisely, Howell et al. (2018) finds that 54% of tokens are sold at ICO, while Amsden
and Schweizer (2018) put this number at 60%. Interestingly, Howell et al. (2018) also find that
only about one third of the ICOs in their sample include vesting provisions that lock up the tokens
not sold at ICO (or part of them) for some amount of time.
17 Forks of existing projects typically distribute their tokens among the holders of the to-
kens associated with the project from which they are forking, sometimes creating additional
tokens and allocating them to the founding team. For example, the developers behind Bit-
coin Gold allocated to each Bitcoin holder an equal amount of Bitcoin Gold tokens, plus they
created 100,000 new tokens and allocated them to themselves. Airdrops are becoming partic-
ularly popular with projects built on EOS, a decentralized computing platform (currently the
fifth most valuable blockchain project by market capitalization). These projects distribute 20-
30% of their tokens for free, wait for the token to start trading, and then sell part of their
stock of tokens on financial exchanges. The goal seems to be to gain publicity, and to avoid
the (few) legal constraints of an ICO. For more details on EOS airdrops, see https://hacked.com/
everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-first-wave-of-eos-airdrops/.
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Tirole, 2003); that is, whether the open source ethos will be compromised by the
introduction of strong financial incentives.
Closely related is a recent literature building theoretical models of ICOs (see
Sockin and Xiong, 2018; Li and Mann, 2018, Catalini and Gans, 2018; Chod and
Lyandres, 2018). The main difference is that, in my model, the developer can sell
tokens both at ICO and post-ICO. That is, these papers focus on a specific aspect
of seigniorage (the ICO), while my goal is to capture it in its entirety. Of course,
the converse is that these papers provide a more realistic and detailed description
of how ICOs work, while here I simply assume that an ICO is an auction. A second
important difference is that here the quality of the project is endogenous, which
allows the study of the incentives for innovation generated by ICOs, and seigniorage
more in general. With the exception of Chod and Lyandres (2018), all other papers
building theoretical models of ICO, instead, take the quality of the project as given.
There is a small but growing literature studying how blockchain works (see, for
example Catalini and Gans, 2016; Huberman, Leshno, and Moallemi, 2017; Dimitri,
2017; Prat and Walter, 2018; Ma, Gans, and Tourky, 2018; Budish, 2018). Within
this literature, closely related is Biais, Bisiere, Bouvard, and Casamatta (2018),
in which the price of a token and incentives of miners (i.e., the computers that
process transactions and therefore constitute the nodes of the Bitcoin blockchain) are
determined in the equilibrium of a game-theoretic model. Also in my paper, prices
and incentives are determined in equilibrium, but the interest is in the incentives to
develop the protocol rather than processing transactions. The portion of the model
that determines the equilibrium price of the token borrows heavily from Athey,
Parashkevov, Sarukkai, and Xia (2017), who propose an equilibrium model of the
price of Bitcoin in which the demand comes both from users and investors. The
novelty with respect to their paper is that, here, the demand for tokens (originating
from both investors and users) is a function of the developer’s effort and investment,
while the “quality” of the Bitcoin protocol is taken as given in their model (but is
unknown and therefore discovered over time).18
18 A second, more technical, difference is that Athey et al. (2017) assume that the demand for
Bitcoins by investors is zero in the long run. I, instead, allow this demand to be positive. Indeed,
the fraction of tokens held by investors in the long run will be an important determinant of the
equilibrium of the model and of its efficiency properties.
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Gans and Halaburda (2015) study platform-based digital currencies, such as
Facebook credits and Amazon coins. These currencies share some similarities with
the tokens discussed in the Introduction, because they can be used to perform ex-
changes on a specific platform. They are, however, controlled by their respective
platforms, which decide on their supply and the extent to which they can be traded
or exchanged. This may explain why, despite some initial concerns,19 these cur-
rencies have neither gained wide adoption, nor generated significant profits for the
platform issuing them.
A line of literature that is also related is the one studying how the financial
market may weaken incentive schemes faced by managers (see, for example, the
seminal work by Diamond and Verrecchia, 1982 and the most recent Bisin, Gottardi,
and Rampini, 2008; Acharya and Bisin, 2009). The reason is that, also in my model,
the possibility of trading on the financial market reduces the incentives to exert effort
and invest. The environment considered here is, however, different from the one in
these papers, because there is no contract between the issuer of the currency (the
developer) and those holding the currency (the investors). The developer’s incentive
problem depends on how the equilibrium price of the token is determined and how
this price is affected by the developer’s actions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model
of seigniorage. Section 3 solves for its equilibrium. Section 4 illustrates the first
best of the model and compares it to its equilibrium. Section 5 discusses some
extensions to the model, and Section 6 concludes. Unless otherwise noted, all proofs
and mathematical derivations missing from the text are in the Appendix.
2 The model
The economy is composed of a developer, a large mass of risk-neutral price-taking
investors and a large mass of users. At the beginning of every period 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the
developer exerts effort et and invests it into the development of a blockchain-based
19 See, for example “Could a gigantic nonsovereign like Facebook someday launch a real currency
to compete with the dollar, euro, yen and the like?” by Matthew Yglesias on Slate, February 29,
2012 (available at http://www.slate.com/articles/business/cashless_society/2012/02/facebook_
credits_how_the_social_network_s_currency_could_compete_with_dollars_and_euros_
.html).
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protocol, which can be used by users to transact with each other. The development
of the protocol lasts T periods, after which the developer exits the game and the
protocol continues being used indefinitely. At the beginning of the game, the devel-
oper establishes that all transactions using the protocol must be conducted using a
specific token, with total supply M , fully owned by the developer.
In period to ≤ T , the developer sells some tokens to investors via an auction.
This stage is the ICO (Initial Coin Offering) stage, and its date to is chosen by the
developer.20 In each period after the ICO, but before the developer exits the game
(that is, in every t ∈ {to+1, ..., T}), first the developer exerts effort and invests, next
a frictionless market for tokens opens and then users can use the protocol. In every
period after the developer exits (that is, in every t > T ), first the market for tokens
opens and then users use the protocol. See Figure 2 for a graphical representation
of the timeline.
Investors. Investors are risk-neutral profit maximizers with no cash constraints.
They can purchase tokens in every period and sell them during any subsequent
period. Importantly, when buying or selling tokens on the market, they are price
takers: their net demand for tokens in period t depends on the sequence of token
prices from period t onward, which they take as given. Investors do not discount
the future, and are indifferent between purchasing any amount of tokens in period
t whenever pt = p¯t ≡ maxs>t {E[ps]}, where p¯t is, therefore, the largest future
expected price. If instead pt > p¯, then the investors’ demand for tokens in period t
is zero. Finally, if pt < p¯, then the investors’ demand for tokens in period t is not
defined.
Users. In every period t ≥ to, there is a market for tokens, in which users can
purchase tokens to be used with the protocol. The total value of all exchanges
occurring using the protocol during a given period is the value of the protocol and
20 As we will see when solving for the equilibrium, the important element of an auction is that
the developer specifies in advance what share of the total stock of tokens will be sold and what
share will be kept by the developer. Hence, despite the fact that not all ICOs are auctions (see, for
example, the practice of holding uncapped ICOs in which the token’s price is fixed and the number
of tokens sold is determined in equilibrium), the results derived in this paper extend to other types
of ICOs, as long as these shares are specified in advance.
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1 ≤ t < to (pre-ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
t = to (ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
Auction for tokens
to < t ≤ T (post-ICO)
t+ 1
effort et
investment it
Market for tokens opens
Users use the protocol
The developer exits in period T
t = T + 1
t+ 1
Market for tokens opens
Users use the protocol
Fig. 2: Timeline
is defined as:
Vt =
t∑
s=1
f(es, is), (1)
where f(., .) is increasing in both arguments, concave in et, with limi→∞
{
∂f(et,it)
∂it
}
=
0 for all et. For ease of notation, I assume that each user can access the market for
tokens only once in every period.21 This implies that those who use the protocol to
purchase goods and services in period t have a demand for tokens in period t equal
to Vt
pt
. Instead, those who use the protocol to sell goods or services in period t have
a supply of tokens in period t+ 1 equal to Vt
pt
.22
21 That is, the velocity of the token is 1. Assuming a different velocity will introduce an additional
parameter without affecting the results.
22 This is abstracting away from the fact that, from period-t point of view, the price in period
t+1 may be uncertain, which may affect the willingness to trade using the protocol and the value
of the protocol. Introducing this additional complication does not change the equilibrium price
for tokens and hence the developer’s incentive to exert effort and invest. I will argue later that,
because no development occurs past period T , the price of the token is constant from T onward.
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The key assumption is that the value of the protocol is increasing in the sequence
of effort and investment. The developer’s effort and investment improve the protocol,
in the sense of reducing transaction costs, increasing ease of use, increasing security,
and reliability. As a consequence, more users (both on the selling side and on
the buying side) will use the protocol to perform more/larger transactions. The
above specification, however, abstracts away from a possible coordination problem
in the adoption phase of the protocol. That is, because of network externalities,
it is possible that for a given sequence of effort and investment there is both a
“high adoption” equilibrium (in which the value of the protocol is high) and a “low
adoption” equilibrium (in which the value of the protocol is low). With a minimal
loss of generality, the reader can interpret Vt as the value of the protocol in one of
these equilibria, the one that the developer expects to emerge.23 Finally, the above
formulation implies that the token is used as a mean of exchange. If the token
is necessary in order to use the protocol, but without being a means of exchange,
then Vt is a measure of token usage which is not necessarily equal to the value of the
exchanges occurring using the protocol. All of the results presented are robust to this
different interpretation, with the exception of the back-of-the envelope calculations
in Sections 4 and 5.1.
The developer. Call Qt ≤ M the stock of tokens held by the developer at the
beginning of period t, with Q1 = M . Call:
At ≡ a+
t−1∑
s=1
[(Qs −Qs+1) · ps − is] = At−1 − it−1 + pt−1(Qt−1 −Qt)
the total resources available to the developer at the beginning of period t, where a is
the developer’s initial assets (cash) and the rest are resources earned from the sale
Furthermore, the value of the protocol from T onward must be larger than the value of the protocol
in any previous period. Because of the investors, the price of the token in every period before T
is equal to the expected price of the token at T , which implies that only the expected value of the
protocol in period T matters in equilibrium. This remains true when uncertainty depresses the
usage of the protocol in periods before T .
23 The loss of generality is that either the “high” or the “low” adoption equilibrium may not
exist for some sequences of effort and investment, generating a discontinuity in the way effort and
investment maps into the value of the protocol.
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of tokens in previous periods, net of the investments made. To account for the fact
that during periods t < to the developer cannot sell tokens, I impose that pt ≡ 0
for all t < to. Intuitively, in any t < to the developer cannot sell tokens but can
destroy them, which is equivalent to selling them at price zero. Of course, this will
not happen in equilibrium.
In every period, the developer maximizes his end-of-life assets AT+1 minus the
disutility of effort. He faces a per-period feasibility constraint determining the largest
investment that can be made:
it ≤ At,
and a per-period cash constraint determining the maximum amount of tokens that
can be purchased by the developer:
pt max {Qt+1 −Qt, 0} ≤ At − it.
Note that the cash constraint is always tighter than the feasibility constraint, which
can therefore be disregarded.
Similar to investors, the developer does not discount the future either. Hence,
his problem can be rewritten in recursive form as, for t < T :
Ut(Qt, At) ≡ max
Qt,et,it
{
−1
2
e2t + Ut+1(Qt+1, At + (Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it)+
λt(At − it − pt max {Qt+1 −Qt, 0})} ,
and for t = T :
UT (QT , AT ) ≡ max
eT ,iT
{
AT +QT · pT − iT − 1
2
e2T + λT (AT − iT )
}
,
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the period-t cash constraint.
The sequence of effort, investments and Qt are assumed observable by investors
and users at the beginning of each period. The developer understands the price
formation mechanism.
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3 Solution
3.1 Periods t ≥ T
In this section, I show that, given the setup of the model and an appropriate equi-
librium selection criterion (introduced below), the price of the token in period T
is strictly increasing in the value of the protocol VT—and hence in the sequence
of effort and investments made by the developer. It is important to keep in mind,
however, that the solution to the developer’s problem will depend exclusively on
the fact that pT is strictly increasing in VT , while the details of how VT affects pT
will be relevant only to derive closed-form solutions. That is, the model is robust
to different assumptions about what happens from period T onward (for example,
regarding the demand and supply of tokens by users or investors), provided that
under these different assumptions pT is increasing in VT .
The presence of investors and the fact that no development is possible after
period T implies that the price of the token must be constant from period T onward.
Investors are therefore indifferent between holding cash and holding the token, which
implies that there are multiple equilibria: the price of the token will depend on the
stock of tokens held by the investors, who are indifferent between holding any level
of tokens.
To break this indeterminacy, I impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1. In equilibrium, the stock of tokens held by investors from period
t ≥ T is γ ·M for γ ∈ [0, 1).
That is, out of the many equilibria possible, I am interested here in those in which
the demand for tokens by investors is a constant fraction of the stock of tokens M .
The term γ ·M therefore represents the “speculative” demand for tokens: the
demand for tokens driven by the expectation that future investors will also demand
γ ·M . Next to this demand, in every period there is a demand and a supply for
tokens originating from users. Because the stock of tokens available to users is
(1− γ) ·M , the price for tokens must solve:
pT =
VT
(1− γ)M .
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The important observation is that the price at which the developer can sell his tokens
in period T is strictly increasing in the value of the protocol VT , and therefore in
the prior sequence of effort and investments.
3.2 The developer’s problem
In solving the developer’s problem, the following observation will play a key role.
Because investors are price takers, in every t > to their demand for tokens depend
exclusively on pt and p¯t (the largest future price) and not on the quantity of tokens
sold by the developer in period t.24 In particular, if pt = p¯t, then investors are indif-
ferent between purchasing any amount of tokens. At the same time, the equilibrium
price in period t should reflect effort and investments made prior to t. Hence, be-
cause the instantaneous demand for tokens by investors is inelastic to the supply of
tokens, in every period the developer can sell any amount of tokens at the market
price. But because prices react to effort and investment which in turn depend on
the stock of tokens held by the developer, the amount sold by the developer in each
period will have an effect on future prices.
It is useful to solve the developer’s problem by considering two cases. The first
is the “rich developer” case, in which the developer’s initial assets a are sufficient
to cover the optimal level of investment in every period. In this case, the cash
constraint is never binding and can be ignored. The second case is that of a “poor
developer”, in which the cash constraint is binding for at least one period.
3.2.1 Rich developer
If the cash constraint is never binding, the developer’s utility can be written as, for
t ≤ T − 1:
U˜t(Qt) ≡ max
Qt+1,et,it
{
(Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it − 1
2
e2t + U˜t+1(Qt+1)
}
,
24 Of course, the equilibrium price will be such that demand equals supply; the point is simply
that in a price-taking environment the demand cannot be a function of the supply.
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and for t = T :
U˜T (QT ) ≡ max
eT ,iT
{
QT · pT − iT − 1
2
e2T
}
.
Note that (Qt −Qt+1) · pt − it is the cash generated in period t, net of investment.
Because there is no discounting and the cash constraint is never binding, I can
include this cash in period-t utility function (i.e., the period in which it is generated),
even if it is consumed in period T .
Consider the last period of the developer’s life. The fact that pT increases in eT
and iT immediately implies that U˜T (QT ) is strictly convex. The argument is quite
standard: if eT and iT were fixed, then pT would be fixed and U˜T (QT ) would be
linear in QT . However, the optimal eT and iT are:25
e∗(QT ) ≡ argmaxe
{
f(e, i∗(QT ))
QT
(1− γ)M −
1
2
e2
}
(2)
i∗(QT ) ≡ argmaxi
{
f(e∗(QT ), i)
QT
(1− γ)M − i
}
. (3)
As long as either e∗(QT ) or i∗(QT ) are positive for some QT ≤ M (an assumption
maintained in order to avoid trivialities), then optimal effort and investment react
to changes in QT , which implies that U˜T (QT ) must grow faster than linearly.
Consider now the choice of QT in period T − 1. For given eT−1 and iT−1, the
developer chooses QT so as to maximize pT−1(QT−1−QT )+U˜T (QT ), which is strictly
convex in QT because U˜T (QT ) is strictly convex. It follows that, depending on pT−1,
the developer will either sell all of his tokens (when pT−1 is high), purchase as many
tokens as possible (when pT−1 is low), or be indifferent between these two options.
The price at which the developer is indifferent is:
pT−1 =
U˜T (M)
M
=
VT−1 + f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M −
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M
, (4)
where VT−1+f(e
∗(M),i∗(M))
(1−γ)M is the period T price in case the developer holds M tokens
25 With a slight abuse of notation, I ignore the time index when writing optimal effort and optimal
investment. I show below that these functions are, in fact, time invariant. Note also that, under
the assumptions made on f(., .) optimal effort and investment must exist. However, they may not
be unique. In what follows, for ease of exposition, I implicitly assume that they are indeed unique,
although no result depends on this assumption.
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at the beginning of period T .
Note, however, that if investors expect the developer to sell all of his tokens, they
should also expect no effort or investment in period T , and therefore pT−1 should be
low. If instead they expect the developer to set QT = M , they should expect maxi-
mum effort and investments in period T and therefore pT−1 should be high. Thus,
we have an anti-coordination problem, which implies that the unique equilibrium is
in mixed strategy: the price will be such that the developer is indifferent, and the
developer will randomize between QT = 0 and QT = M .
More precisely, if the developer sells all of his tokens in period T − 1, then the
price in period T will be VT−1
(1−γ)M . If instead the developer purchases M tokens in
period T − 1, then pT = VT−1+f(e
∗(M),i∗(M))
(1−γ)M . Because investors must be indifferent
between purchasing in period T or period T − 1, it must be that:
pT−1 =
VT−1
(1− γ)M + (1− αT−1)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M ,
where αT−1 is the probability that the developer sells all of his tokens in period
T − 1, which using (4) can be written as:
αT−1 = (1− γ) (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
.
For intuition, note that (e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M) is the cost generated by holding M
tokens, coming from the additional effort and investment that the developer will
exert in period T . Instead:
M · f(e
∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M ,
is the benefit of setting QT = M , coming from the increase in the value of these
tokens due to the developer’s effort and investment in period T . αT−1 is therefore
equal to the ratio between cost and benefit of holdingM tokens in period T . Because
effort and investment are chosen optimally, the benefit should be at least as large
as the cost, and therefore αT−1 ≤ 1.
The following proposition shows that these results generalize to every period in
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which the market for tokens operates.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium post-ICO). In every period t ∈ {to + 1, ..., T}:
1. Optimal effort and investment for given Qt are e∗(Qt) and i∗(Qt), given by (2)
and (3),
2. The developer sells all his tokens (so that Qt+1 = 0) with probability
αt =
1 if t = T(1− γ) (e∗(M))2/2+i∗(M)
f(e∗(M),i∗(M)) otherwise
(5)
and purchases all tokens (so that Qt+1 = M) with probability 1− αt,
3. The price of tokens as a function of past effort and investment is
pt =
Vt + (1− αt)(T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M . (6)
The proposition is based on the fact that all U˜t(Qt) are strictly convex and,
therefore, in every period t < T the equilibrium price must be such that the agent
is indifferent between holding all of his tokens and selling all of his tokens. But this
also implies that the agent is indifferent between selling all of his tokens in period t
or holding M in every period until T . The benefit of exerting effort and of investing
in a given period is therefore given by the resulting change in pT , which is constant
over time and given by (2) and (3).
Hence, whenever Qt = M the value of the protocol increases by f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
in period t, while if Qt = 0 the value of the protocol does not change in period t. The
probability that Qt = 0 is such that investors are indifferent between holding the
token at t−1 or at t, and is also constant over time. It follows that the price in period
t (Equation (6)) reflects past effort and past investment via the term Vt, as well as
expected future effort and investment via the term (1− αt)(T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M)).
This expression can also be interpreted as the law of motion of the price, because it
implies that, in every period t ≤ T , the price of token will increase by:
(e∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
M
,
3 Solution 21
with probability:
1− (1− γ) e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
,
and will decrease by:
1
M
(
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
1− γ − (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M))
)
,
otherwise.
Period to (the ICO) is characterized by the fact that tokens are sold via an
auction. Hence, contrary to all subsequent periods, in period to the price of a token
depends on the number of tokens sold, which is M − Qto . Again, in equilibrium,
investors must be indifferent, and therefore, for any number of tokens sold at ICO,
it must be that pto = pto+1. Hence, whenever to < T , the developer’s problem at
ICO can be written as:
max
Qto+1
{
U˜to+1(Qto+1) + (M −Qto+1)pto
}
=
max
Qto+1
{
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
Qto+1 · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1
}
+ (M −Qto+1)pto+1
}
≤
max
Qto+1
{
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
Qto+1 · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1 + (M −Qto+1)pto+1
}}
=
max
eto+1,ito+1
{
M · pto+1 −
1
2
e2to+1 − ito+1
}
= U˜to+1(M),
where the first and the last equality follow from writing U˜to+1(Qto+1) explicitly (un-
der the assumption that the developer sells all of his tokens in period to+1). The
developer therefore anticipates that the price of tokens will be the same at ICO and
in the following period, independently from how many token he sells. The number
of tokens sold, however, determines the equilibrium level of effort and investment
in period to+1. By choosing Qto+1 = M , the developer maximizes effort and invest-
ments in period to+1, and therefore the price in period to+1. If instead to = T , then
the developer sells all of his tokens during the ICO, and then exits the game. The
following proposition summarizes these observations.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium at to). If the ICO occurs before T , then the developer
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does not sell any tokens at ICO. It follows that Qto+1 = M with probability 1. Effort
and investment in all t ≤ to + 1 are e∗(M) and i∗(M) with probability 1. If instead
the ICO occurs at period T , then the developer sells all of his tokens at ICO.
Proof. In the text.
Period to + 1 is therefore the only period in which the market for tokens is open
and the developer contributes to the development of the protocol with probability
1.
With respect to the optimal timing of the ICO, the previous proposition shows
that optimal effort and investment between period 1 and to+1 are e∗(M) and i∗(M).
In all subsequent periods, instead, the existence of the market for tokens creates a
commitment problem: the value of the protocol is maximized when the developer
holds M tokens in every period until T , but this cannot happen in equilibrium.
From period to+2 onward, the developer exerts effort and invests with probability
less than one, which implies the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium to). The developer holds the ICO either in period T
or in period T − 1.
Proof. In the text.
Note that if the ICO is held in period T − 1, the developer will auction off 0
tokens, and will sell M tokens on the market in period T . If instead the ICO is in
period T , the developer will sell all of his tokens via the auction. Holding the ICO
in period T − 1 or period T , therefore, achieves the same outcome: the developer
does not sell any tokens before period T and sells all of his tokens in period T . As a
consequence, effort and investment are e∗(M) and i∗(M) with probability 1 in every
period.
Corollary 1. The cash constraint is never binding (and hence we are in the “rich
developer” case) if and only if a ≥ T · i∗(M).
Proof. Immediate from the above Proposition.
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That is, we are in the “rich developer” case whenever the developer does not need
to sell tokens to finance the optimal amount of investment.
Finally, it is easy to check that the developers’ utility does not depend on the
total stock of tokensM . From (2) and (3) we know that the equilibrium sequence of
effort and investment depends on M exclusively via the share of tokens held by the
developer. This share is 1 for t ≤ to, and can be either 1 or 0 for to < t ≤ T (with the
probability of being 1 or 0 given by 5, also independent from M). This implies that
VT and, as a consequence, ptM are independent from M . The developer’s utility is
therefore independent from M for any to.
3.2.2 Poor developer
The rich developer case focuses on one side of seigniorage: the incentives provided
to the developer. It shows that the developer will hold the ICO just before exiting
the game, as a way to commit to the highest level of effort and investment in every
period.
There is, however, a second side of seigniorage: its ability to channel funds from
investors to the developer, to be then used in the development of the protocol. I
now introduce this aspect into the model by assuming that the developer is “poor”,
in the sense that a < T · i∗(M): the developer cannot invest efficiently in all periods,
and the cash constraint could be binding.
To focus on the role of the cash constraint, I introduce the following functional
form:
f(e, i) ≡ g(e)1{i ≥ i}, (A1)
where 1{} is the indicator function, and g(e) is strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave. Hence, i is an essential input in the development of the protocol, because effort
is productive only if i ≥ i. However, investing more that i is also not productive.
The choice of optimal investment, therefore, simplifies to the choice between two
levels: i and 0.
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Given this, period-T effort and investment are:
eˆT (QT , iT ) ≡
e
∗(QT ) ≡ argmaxe
{
g(e) QT
(1−γ)M − 12e2
}
if iT ≥ i
0 otherwise
(7)
iˆT (QT , AT ) ≡
i if i ≤ maxe
{
g(e) QT
(1−γ)M − 12e2
}
and i ≤ AT
0 otherwise.
(8)
To avoid trivial equilibria in which there is never any effort or investment, I
furthermore assume that:
i < maxe
{
g(e)
1
1− γ −
1
2
e2
}
, (A2)
that is: there is a level of QT for which the developer will invest and exert posi-
tive effort whenever his assets are sufficient to do so. I call the threshold level Qˆ,
implicitly defined as:
Qˆ ≡ Q : i = maxe
{
g(e)
Q
(1− γ)M −
1
2
e2
}
. (9)
In the remainder of this section, I fully solve for the equilibrium in periods T
and T − 1, depending on whether the ICO happened in period T , T − 1 or in any
earlier period. I will only informally discuss the equilibrium in periods before T −1.
Nonetheless, I will provide a characterization of the optimal timing of the ICO.
Case 1: to = T . If the ICO occurs in the last period, then optimal effort and
investment in period T are given by (7) and (8). The price of a token is therefore:
VT−1
(1− γ)M +
0 if AT < ig(e∗(M))
(1−γ)M otherwise.
In period T − 1, the choice of optimal investment affects AT and the period-T
optimal effort and investment. This is relevant whenever i ≤ AT−1 < 2i, that is,
whenever assets in period T − 1 are not sufficient to invest optimally in both period
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T − 1 and period T . It is immediately clear that, in this case, the final price is
always VT−2+g(e
∗(M))
(1−γ)M , independent from whether effort and investment are positive
in period T − 1 or in period T . The same logic applies to the choice of investment
and effort in any earlier period. Define:
n ≡ argmaxk∈{1,2,...,T}{k · i ≤ a}, (10)
as the number of periods in which the developer can invest efficiently using his initial
assets exclusively. The above discussion implies that the developer will invest and
exert effort for n periods, and he is indifferent with respect to which ones. The
following proposition summarizes these observations.
Proposition 4 (ICO in period T ). Whenever to = T , the final value of the protocol
is VT = n · e∗(M).
Proof. In the text.
Case 2: to = T − 1. If the ICO occurs in period T − 1, then the developer can
finance some of the period T investment by selling tokens in period T−1. Remember
that, in equilibrium, the price of tokens at ICO pT−1 must be equal to pT . Hence,
for given M −QT (i.e., tokens sold at ICO), the price for tokens will be:
pT =
VT−1
(1− γ)M +
0 if AT−1 − iT−1 + pT (M −QT ) < ig(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M otherwise.
(11)
Whenever AT−1 − iT−1 < i (that is, whenever the developer does not have enough
own funds to invest in period T ), both LHS and RHS of (11) depend on pT , and
therefore for given QT there are multiple equilibrium pT . For intuition, suppose
that the developer announces the sale of M −QT tokens at ICO. If investors expect
pT to be low, they will drive down pT−1 (the price at ICO), which implies that the
level of investment achievable in period T by selling M −QT at ICO may be below
i, which justifies the initial expectation. If instead investors expect pT to be high,
in equilibrium pT−1 will also be high, which implies that the level of investment
achievable in period T by selling M − QT tokens at ICO may be above i, which
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justifies the initial expectation. This can be interpreted as a coordination problem
among investors. For any number of tokens sold by the developer at ICO, investors
may coordinate on a “high” equilibrium that leads to high effort and investment in
period T , or on a “low” equilibrium leading to low (or no) effort and investment in
period T . Call p(QT ) the correspondence mapping QT to the equilibrium pT . We
therefore have (see also Figure 3):
p(QT ) =

VT−1
(1−γ)M if
i+iT−1−AT−1
M−QT <
VT−1+g(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M
VT−1+g(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M if
i+iT−1−AT−1
M−QT >
VT−1
(1−γ)M{
VT−1
(1−γ)M ,
VT−1+g(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M
}
otherwise.
QT
VT−1
(1−γ)M
Qˆ M
VT−1+g(e∗(QT ))
(1−γ)M
i+iT−1−AT−1
M−QT
Fig. 3: p(QT ) whenever i+ iT−1 > AT−1.
Given this, we can solve for the utility-maximizing QT . As a preliminary step,
the next lemma shows that UT (QT , AT ) is convex in QT , provided that the developer
has enough wealth to invest, and provided that he has enough “skin in the game” in
the sense that QT > Qˆ.
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Lemma 1. UT (QT , AT ) is strictly convex in QT whenever i ≤ AT and QT ≥ Qˆ, and
is otherwise linear in QT . UT (QT , AT ) is linearly increasing in AT with slope 1 (cor-
responding to the marginal utility of consumption), and has an upward discontinuity
at AT = i if and only if QT ≥ Qˆ.
Proof. By the same argument made in the previous case: UT (QT , AT ) is linear in QT
whenever optimal investment and effort do not change with QT , and is strictly con-
vex whenever optimal investment and effort depend on QT . Similarly, UT (QT , AT )
is discontinuous in AT whenever the level of wealth allows for the optimal level of
investment.
Note, however, that AT is also a function of QT , because:
AT = AT−1 + (M −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1,
where pT−1 ∈ p(QT ) is the price of tokens at ICO. Hence, the choice ofQT determines
both period T ’s incentives to exert effort and whether the developer will have enough
resources to invest. The next lemma shows that the continuation value is maximized
at:
Q∗T = M −
max{iT−1 + i− AT−1, 0}
pT−1
, (12)
which is the largest QT such that the developer can invest i in period T .
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium in period T − 1 for to = T − 1). If Q∗T > Qˆ the developer
chooses QT = Q∗T ; there is positive investment and effort in period T . If instead
Q∗T ≤ Qˆ then the developer is indifferent between any QT , and there is no investment
or effort in period T . When AT−1− iT−1 < i¯ multiple equilibria are possible and Q∗T
may not be unique. When AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i¯ the equilibrium is unique and Q∗T = M .
For intuition, remember that the developer has incentives to invest and exert
effort in period T only if QT > Qˆ. Whether QT > Qˆ is attainable depends on the
cash constraint. If this constraint is tight, Q∗T ≤ Qˆ and no level of QT that allows
for positive investment will generate sufficient incentives, and hence there will be no
development in period T . If instead the cash constraint is sufficiently loose, then
Q∗T > Qˆ and for some level of QT there will be positive effort and investment in
period T .
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In this last case, multiple equilibria are possible. This is because the right
hand side of (12) may be neither monotonic nor continuous (remember that pT−1 ∈
p(QT )). That is, even assuming that the investors can solve their coordination
problem and therefore p(QT ) is a function and not a correspondence, there is an
additional coordination problem between developer and investors giving rise to mul-
tiple equilibrium Q∗T . Suppose that AT−1 − iT−1 < i, so that the developer needs
to sell some tokens at ICO in order to finance future development. If the price in
period T is expected to be high, so will be the price in period T − 1 and, as a conse-
quence, the developer needs to sell fewer tokens in order to achieve iT = i. Because
he can hold a large fraction of tokens, future effort will be high, which implies that
today’s price for tokens should be high. Similarly, if period-T price is expected to
be low, price at ICO will be low, and the developer needs to sell a large fraction
of his tokens, which implies that future effort will be low, as should today’s price.
If instead AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i, then the developer does not need to sell any tokens
to finance his future investment and, as a consequence, in the unique equilibrium
Q∗T = M .
Consider now optimal investment and effort in period T−1. It is easy to see that
optimal effort is again given by (7). The choice of optimal investment, instead, has
an inter-temporal element to consider: for given initial assets, the choice of period
T − 1 investment affects the equilibrium at ICO and therefore Q∗T . This is relevant
whenever AT−1 < 2i, in which case the developer may choose not to invest in period
T − 1, so as to set Q∗T = M .
It is, however, easy to show that postponing the investment is never optimal.
Suppose that the developer has sufficient funds to invest in only one period. If the
developer invests in period T − 1, then total utility is:
VT−2 + g∗(M) + g∗(Q∗T )
(1− γ)M M −
1
2
(e∗(M))2 − 1
2
(e∗(g∗(Q∗T ))
2.
If instead the developer does not invest in T − 1, he can set QT = M and achieve
utility:
VT−2 + g∗(M)
(1− γ)M M − (e
∗(M))2.
Comparing the above two expressions, it is clear that the developer is better off using
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his own funds for investing in period T − 1, and then financing period-T investment
via the sale of tokens at ICO. This reasoning extends to any period prior to the
ICO, and therefore implies the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (ICO in period 2). Whenever to = T − 1, the final value of the
protocol is:
VT =
3g∗(M) if a ≥ 3ing∗(M) + g∗(Q∗T ) otherwise,
where n is defined in (10) and Q∗T is defined in (12).
Proof. In the text.
Case 3: to < T −1. If the ICO occurred in period to < T −1, then in period T −1
there is a market for tokens. I start by considering the choice of QT , that is, how
many tokens to sell or buy on the market in period T − 1. For a given market price
pT−1, the developer’s utility as a function of QT is:
UT (QT , AT−1+(QT−1 −QT )·pT−1−iT−1)+λT−1(AT−1−iT−1−pT−1 max {QT −QT−1, 0}).
There are similarities with the previous case (i.e., the case of an ICO in period
T − 1). Also here, the choice of QT determines the assets available in the following
period. As a consequence, the continuation value:
UT (QT , AT−1 + (QT−1 −QT ) · pT−1 − iT−1),
is strictly convex in QT only for:
Qˆ ≤ QT ≤ Q∗T ,
and is linearly increasing in QT otherwise, with a downward discontinuity at Q∗T
(where Q∗T is defined in (12)).
There are, however, two important differences with the previous case. The first
one is that, here, the developer could have sold some tokens during a previous period,
and therefore it is possible that QT−1 < M . It follows that the cash constraint in
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period T − 1 may be binding. In this respect, note that if the cash constraint
in period T − 1 is binding, then AT = 0 and the cash constraint in period T is
binding. Conversely, if the period T cash constraint is binding, we have AT = i,
which implies that the period T −1 cash constraint is not binding. Hence, in solving
for QT , the only constraint that needs to be taken into consideration is the period-T
cash constraint.
Second, and most importantly, because investors are price takers, then the mar-
ket price in period T − 1 does not depend on QT . Only period-T price depends on
QT , leading to the same type of anti-coordination problem discussed in the “rich
developer” case.
Lemma 3 (Equilibrium in period T − 1 for to < T − 1). If Q∗T ≤ Qˆ, then the
developer is indifferent between holding any level of QT . Effort and investment in
period T are zero, so that pT = pT−1 =
VT−1
(1−γ)M .
If instead Q∗T > Qˆ, then, in equilibrium, the developer is indifferent between
setting QT = 0 and setting QT = Q∗T . He sets QT = 0 with probability:
αT−1 =
(
1
2
(e∗(Q∗T )
2 + i
)(
Q∗T ·
g(e∗(Q∗T )
(1− γ)M
)−1
.
The equilibrium price is:
pT−1 =
VT−1 + (1− αT−1)g(e∗(Q∗T ))
(1− γ)M .
If AT−1 − iT−1 ≤ i multiple equilibria are possible, while if AT−1 − iT−1 > i the
equilibrium is always unique.
By comparing the above lemma with Lemma 2, we see that, whenever Q∗ > Qˆ,
if the market for tokens exists the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, while if the
tokens are sold via an ICO the equilibrium is in pure strategies. The reason is that
the presence of the market generates the same anti-coordination problem discussed
in the previous section. The developer randomizes between selling everything and
setting QT = 0 and holding the maximum number of tokens, which is the minimum
between the one at which period-T cash constraint is binding and M .
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The other features of the equilibrium are similar. In particular, whenever AT−1−
iT−1 ≤ i there could be multiple equilibria. There could be an equilibrium in
which pT−1 is high, which implies that the developer needs to sell only a few tokens
to finance future investment, and therefore period-T effort is high. Next to this
equilibrium, there could be one in which pT−1 is low, which implies that the developer
needs to sell many tokens to finance future investment, and therefore period-T effort
is low. If, instead, AT−1 − iT−1 > i, then the developer does not need to sell any
tokens to achieve iT = i, and this coordination problem is absent. In case the
market for tokens is open, there are therefore multiple mixed strategy equilibria,
each corresponding to a different Q∗T and a different pT−1.
Deriving the equilibrium in earlier periods is complicated by the fact that the
choice of investment in every period affects the equilibrium in all subsequent periods.
For example, the choice of iT−1 affects Q∗T . Hence, the developer may want to set
iT−1 = 0 even if AT−1 ≥ i and QT−1 > Qˆ so as to achieve a higher Q∗T . Not only,
but because there are multiple equilibrium Q∗T , the choice of iT−1 may determine
what equilibrium emerges in the market for tokens. This difficulty extends to the
choice of QT−2, because QT−2 determines iT−1.
Despite these issues, it is possible to characterize the developer’s choice of when
to hold an ICO. The reason is that every time the market is open, there is the basic
anti-coordination problem discussed earlier and the equilibrium is in mixed strategy.
If instead the developer does not hold the ICO and has sufficient funds to invest i¯,
he will set a high level of effort and investments with probability 1. Hence, if the
developer’s funds are greater that i¯, he will never want to hold the ICO. But if the
developers funds are below i¯, then no development will occur unless the developer
holds the ICO. This observation implies the following proposition.
Proposition 6. In equilibrium to = n, that is, the developer initially invests using
his own funds, and holds the ICO as soon as his funds are below i¯.
Proof. In the text.
To conclude, note that, also here, the developer’s payoff does not depend on M .
The reason is that, in each period, the developer’s problem depends on M only via
the share of M that he holds (see the optimal level of effort (2) and the incentive
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to set positive investment (9)). Therefore, in each period, the value of the protocol
and the value of all outstanding tokens ptM depend on the share of tokens held by
the developer in each period and not on M . In addition, in all cases analyzed, the
equilibrium share of tokens held by the developer in a given period is either zero,
M or Q∗T . It is easy to see that, if ptM is independent from M , so is Q∗T/M , and
therefore the equilibrium share of tokens held by the developer in each period is also
independent from M .
4 First best
In the first best, effort and investment are set to maximize the present discounted
value of the surplus generated by the protocol.26 Furthermore, the ICO is held
immediately so as to allow users to use the protocol from the very beginning.
The equilibrium of the game differs from the first best in several ways. As
already discussed, in equilibrium the developer will want to hold the ICO only after
exhausting his own funds. This is, however, inefficient because users are prevented
from using the protocol before the ICO. The equilibrium post-ICO is also inefficient
because the developer may set zero effort and zero investment, even if the social
value of his effort and investment is strictly positive.
More interestingly, even assuming that the market for tokens exists so that users
can use the protocol and that the developer will set positive effort and investment,
there is an additional source of inefficiency. The developer is setting effort and
investment so as to maximize the value of the protocol in period T , when he will exit
the game. A minor observation is that the value of the protocol in a given period
(i.e., the value of the transactions that occur using the protocol) is, in general,
different from the social surplus generated by the protocol.27 A more important
observation is that, in its objective function, the developer completely disregards
the fact that the protocol will generate value over multiple periods, instead focusing
exclusively on the period in which he will sell all of his tokens and exit the game.
Whether the developer’s effort and investment will be above or below their first
26 The discount factor should be that of users.
27 The social surplus depends on the equilibrium utility/profits of users on the buying and selling
side of the protocol, as well as on their outside options.
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best level is, however, ambiguous as it depends on γ, which determines the elasticity
of the price of token to his effort and investment. If the speculative demand for
tokens is sufficiently high, then the developer will exert effort and investment above
the first best. If instead it is low, then the developer may exert effort and invest
below the first best.
It is possible to resolve this ambiguity by introducing a few simplifying assump-
tions and performing some back-of-the-envelope calculations. Consider the rich de-
veloper case, and assume that the value of the protocol in a given period is a good
approximation of the surplus generated in that period. Social welfare is therefore:28
∞∑
s=T
βs−TVT =
VT
1− β ,
where β is the user’s discount factor.
The choice of effort and investment that maximize social welfare is:
e∗∗ ≡ argmaxe
{
f(e, i∗∗)
1− β −
1
2
e2
}
(13)
i∗∗ ≡ argmaxi
{
f(e∗∗, i)
1− β − i
}
. (14)
By comparing the above expression with the equilibrium level of effort and invest-
ment (equations (2) and (3) for QT = M), it is clear that equilibrium effort and
investment will be below the efficient level if γ < β, and above the efficient level if
γ > β.
Remember that γ is the fraction of tokens held by investors in period T when the
developer exits the game. The fraction of tokens held by investors before T could
be much higher, even close to 100% in early periods. The empirical counterpart for
γ is therefore the fraction of tokens held by investors when the project is mature
and (major) developments no longer occur, which is a stage no blockchain-based
28 This expression assumes that the protocol will not be used before T . It is therefore a measure of
welfare in a “constrained” first best, in which the timing of the ICO cannot be changed. Of course,
the value generated by the platform before T is second order relative to the value generated by
the platform from T onward. We can, therefore, also think of this expression as an approximation
of the unconstrained social welfare.
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protocol has yet reached.
In my opinion, at present the best possible estimate for γ comes by look-
ing at Ethereum. With the exception of Ethereum, all oldest, better established
blockchain-based protocols are digital currencies (such as Bitcoin), where only one
operation is allowed: sending tokens. Because this operation is consistent both with
investors’ behavior and with usage (for example, sending remittances), it is very
difficult to distinguish between users and investors.29 Instead, Ethereum is a de-
centralized computing platform and is used primarily to run software, which are in
this context called smart contracts. The fraction of ETH (Ethereum native token)
paid in fees is therefore a measure of the value of the protocol Vt: the payments (in
tokens) from users of Ethereum to the nodes maintaining the Ethereum network,
performed in exchange for a service—executing a smart contract.30
After collecting data on the total fees paid on the Ethereum network,31 what
remains to do in order to derive γ is to define the length of a period. In the
model, users can exchange fiat money for tokens once in every period. The empirical
equivalent of a “period” is, therefore, the average number of days before a given token
can be used again to pay a fee (that is, the inverse of the velocity of ETH). Absent
any good prior, I will consider different options, from one to 30 days.
I therefore compute the average value of:
1− total transaction fees collected over n days
total stock of ETH
,
for the first six months of 2018, where the n goes from 1 to 30. This value corresponds
to γ, under the assumption that a single period of the model corresponds to n days.
I compare this value to the discount factor over n days, computed assuming a daily
discount factor of 0.015% (approximately a 5% yearly discount factor). As Table 1
shows, for all values of n, the estimated γ is orders of magnitude above β, which
suggests that the equilibrium effort and investment is above the efficient level.32
29 For more details on these difficulties, see Athey et al. (2017).
30 As in the Bitcoin network, these nodes also earn a “per-block” reward. In the case of Ethereum,
however, this reward is a much smaller component of the node’s total payoff. As a consequence,
performing any operation on the Ethereum network requires the payment of a fee.
31 Easily downloadable from several sources, such as https://etherscan.io/chart/transactionfee
32 In these calculations, I considered the total stock of ETH as the total number of ETH at the
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n γ β
1 0,99999 0,00015
2 0,99998 0,00030
3 0,99998 0,00045
4 0,99997 0,00060
5 0,99996 0,00075
6 0,99996 0,00090
7 0,99995 0,00105
8 0,99994 0,00120
9 0,99994 0,00135
10 0,99993 0,00150
20 0.99989 0.00300
30 0.99986 0.00451
Tab. 1: Data from https://etherscan.io/chart, elaborated by the author
The above result is specific to the rich developer case. In the poor developer
case, after ICO, the developer invests and exerts effort with probability less than
one. Furthermore, conditional on exerting effort, because in every period he holds
less than the full stock of tokens, his level of effort and investment are lower than
in the rich developer case. By comparing the values for β and γ in Table 1 for
n = 10, as long as the developer holds more than 0.15% of the share of tokens, he
will set effort and investment above the social optimum. It seems likely, therefore,
that conditional on exerting positive effort and investment, the level of effort and
investments will be above the socially optimal level, even in the “poor developer”
case.
5 Discussion
5.1 Seigniorage vs monopoly pricing
It is possible to compare seigniorage with more standard mechanisms, such as estab-
lishing a set of fees/prices for using the protocol. Profits generated via seigniorage
end of the period (that is, end of June 2018). The conclusion remains the same if I were to consider
the total number of ETH at the beginning of January 2018, or the average total number of ETH
over this period.
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depend on the value of the protocol in the moment at which the developer sells his
tokens. Under standard monopoly pricing, instead, the monopolist is able, in every
period, to capture only a fraction of the value of the protocol (which will depend on
the elasticity of supply and demand). But the monopolist is able to earn profits in
every period; not only in one period.
Profits under seigniorage therefore depend on the value of the protocol in a
given period, while profits under standard monopoly pricing will accrue in every
period. Which one is larger is, again, ambiguous and crucially depends on γ: the
speculative demand for tokens. It is always possible to find a large enough γ such
that profits under seigniorage are greater than profits under monopoly pricing. For
low γ, however, the ranking may reverse.
The same back-of-the envelope calculations reported in Table 1 are useful also
here. Call τ the fraction of total value lost as deadweight loss caused by monopoly
pricing, and ν the fraction of the remaining value that is captured by the monopolist
in every period. Profits earned via monopoly pricing from period T onward are
therefore: ∞∑
s=T
βs−Tν(1− τ)VT = ν(1− τ)VT
1− β ,
which are greater than profits earned via seigniorage if and only if:
ν(1− τ) ≥ 1− β
1− γ .
The above inequality can be satisfied only if β > γ. However, the above calcula-
tions suggest that this inequality does not hold empirically, and hence profits under
seigniorage are larger than profits under monopoly pricing for any value of ν and τ .
5.2 Asymmetric information
The results derived above largely extend to a situation in which the developer’s
productivity is private information. In this case, if the market for tokens is open, for
a given price for tokens there is a threshold productivity above which the developer
wants to hold all tokens, and below which the developer wants to sell all tokens.
The price in every period is equal to the expected price tomorrow, which depends
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on the developer’s expected contribution to the protocol. In every period, if the
developer is more productive that the market expectation, he will purchase tokens
and develop the protocol with probability 1. If the developer is less productive than
the market expectation, he will sell all tokens and not develop the protocol.33
The important observation is that, if at ICO the productivity of the developer
is unknown to investors, it will nonetheless be revealed over time. In the moment
it is fully revealed, the equilibrium of the game is again the one derived in the
previous section. Asymmetry of information therefore implies that developers with
above average productivity may contribute to the development of the protocol with
probability 1 for some periods. Conversely, developers with below average produc-
tivity do not contribute to the protocols initially. After the developer’s productivity
is revealed, he will contribute with probability less than 1, as in the symmetric
information case.
Less obvious is the impact of asymmetric information on the timing of the ICO.
A developer of ability greater than the investors’ expectation may benefit from an-
ticipating the ICO, because he expects to exert effort and invest in the development
of the protocol with probability 1 for a few periods post-ICO. But if this is the case,
then investors should infer that a developer holding an ICO early is of high ability.
This, clearly, cannot be an equilibrium because, now, the high-ability developer no
longer benefits from anticipating the ICO. The full analysis of this problem is left
for future work.
5.3 Multiple, heterogeneous developers
Suppose that there is a population of developers indexed by j, each characterized
by a productivity parameter qjt (commonly known) so that effort and investment by
developer j in period t generates an increase in the value of the protocol equal to
qjt f(e
j
t , i
j
t). If all developers are “rich” (that is, the cash constraint is never binding
for any developer), in every period t the equilibrium price of the token must be such
33 The same argument can be made about wealth. If the developer’s wealth is private information
and affects the development of the protocol, then a developer who is richer than the market
expectation about his wealth will want to purchase all tokens and develop with probability one.
Otherwise he will sell all tokens and not develop.
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that the developer with the largest qit+1 is indifferent between holding all tokens
or no tokens.34 If, furthermore, maxj qjt is constant over time, then the model is
formally identical to the one just solved. The only difference is its interpretation: in
every period a different developer (the most productive in that period) may purchase
tokens and contribute to the development of the protocol.
Contrary to the case considered in the body of the text, now the existence of a
market for tokens generates an allocative efficiency: the most productive developer
works on the project in every period. Of course, as we already saw, this developer
contributes to the project only with some probability. It follows that holding an
ICO has an additional benefit because it allows the most productive developer to
contribute to the project in every period. Absent the ICO, instead, the initial
developer will set high effort and investment in every period, but he may not be the
most productive developer who could work on the project.
If instead some developers are “poor” (i.e., the cash constraint may be binding),
then the most productive developer in a given period may not have enough resources
to purchase tokens and/or invest efficiently in the development of the protocol. The
identity of the developer that, in every period, develops the protocol (with some
probability) depends partly on productivity and partly on wealth.
5.4 Traditional investor
In the rich developer case, the developer uses his own resources to finance the invest-
ment in the protocol, so that seigniorage plays a role exclusively because it generates
profits and provides incentives. In the poor developer case, seigniorage has the addi-
tional role of providing resources to be invested into the development of the protocol.
The comparison between the two cases shows that the use of seigniorage to finance
the investment in the protocol is a second-best response to the developer’s lack of
resource, because the value of the protocol (and the developer’s payoff) is always
higher in the rich developer case. This observation suggests that an external in-
34 Suppose not: then the best developer strictly prefers to hold all tokens and exert the maximum
level of effort and investment in the following period. However, in that case, this developer’s
contribution to the protocol should already be accounted for in the current price, which implies
that he strictly prefers to sell all of his tokens, leading to a contradiction.
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vestor (call it a traditional investor, possibly a venture capital fund or a business
angel) could provide capital to the developer so as to move from the poor developer
to the rich developer case, and by doing so generate extra surplus. Under perfect
contracting, therefore, in the poor developer case the traditional investor would al-
ways provide funds to the developer. Traditional financing and seigniorage are, in
this case, complementary. If instead the investors and the developer are constrained
in the type of contracts they can sign, then the external investor may not provide
funds.35
To illustrate this point, assume that the developer and the investor are limited
to contracts of the following type: the investor provides an amount of cash equal
to I at the beginning of the game, and receives a fraction of tokens ρ at ICO. It
is quite easy to see that such a contract has the advantage of postponing the ICO,
and therefore extending the period in which the developer develops the protocol
with probability 1. However, it also implies that in every period the level of effort
and investment will be lower, because the developer anticipates that his payoff will
be (1 − ρ)MpT . Clearly, there are cases in which the outside investment will not
happen.36
Overall, introducing a traditional investor is welfare-increasing: when a contract
between the developer and the investor is signed, it must be the case that the value of
the protocol increases (relative to no outside investment). But contractual frictions
may prevent the traditional investor and the developer from finding an agreement,
even when such an agreement would be welfare-maximizing.
35 Regarding the fact that traditional investors are investing in compa-
nies that subsequently run an ICO, see https://www.cbinsights.com/research/
blockchain-ico-equity-financing-vc-investments/ and https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-10-03/hedge-funds-flip-icos-leaving-other-investors-holding-the-bag. See also a recent paper
by Chod and Lyandres (2018), who compare traditional venture capital financing with financing
via ICO under the assumption that they are perfect substitutes, and derive conditions under
which one dominates the other.
36 For example, if the developer already has enough funds to invest efficiently in the first T − 1
periods (so that the need for external funds is small) and T is very large (so that the drop in effort
and investment may be small in every single period but have a large effect on the value of the
protocol), then the developer and the investor may not sign a contract.
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6 Conclusion
This paper studies a novel form of financing for open-source software development:
seigniorage. I show that seigniorage is effective at generating incentives and provid-
ing financial resources for the development of open-source blockchain-based proto-
cols. Its effectiveness is, however, limited by the fact that whenever a market for
tokens exists, in equilibrium there is a positive probability that the developer will
sell all of his tokens and that, as a consequence, no development will occur. I also
argue that the equilibrium will be inefficient, because the developer’s objective is
to maximize the value of the protocol in a single period (when he expects to leave
the game), and does not internalize the fact that the protocol generates value over
multiple periods.
The paper shows that, thanks to seigniorage, the developer earns positive prof-
its, users enjoy the full surplus generated by the protocol, while at the same time
investors are left indifferent. Some readers may therefore wonder if seigniorage
is magic. While this result is correct, it is an artifact of the partial-equilibrium
nature of the model. In a general equilibrium framework, introducing the token
increases the supply of money in the economy by an amount equal to the value of
the stock of tokens (which is also the developer’s profits), leading to an increase in
the economy-wide price level.37 Initial holders of cash are therefore made worse off
by the introduction of the token. In this general-equilibrium framework, the devel-
oper should anticipate that an increase in the value of the protocol will lead to an
increase both of the price of the token and of the economy-wide price level, there-
fore reducing the benefit of exerting effort and developing the protocol (relative to
the partial-equilibrium case considered in the body of the paper.) The effect of the
developer’s effort on the economy-wide price level is, however, likely to be negligible
and hence a partial-equilibrium analysis seems appropriate.
The model abstracts away from a few important elements. The first one is asym-
metry of information. This is an intentional feature of the model, and illustrates
the fact that the failure to develop a project following an ICO should not be consid-
ered exclusively as the result of deception and fraud. Nonetheless, how asymmetry
37 For general equilibrium models in which the economy-wide price level depends on the presence
of a cryptocurrency (Bitcoin), see Schilling and Uhlig (2018) and Garratt and Wallace (2018).
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of information changes the equilibrium of the model is an important question. As
discussed in the text, the post-ICO equilibrium only marginally changes with the
introduction of asymmetric information. The choice of the timing of the ICO is
instead likely to be affected in a non-trivial way, especially if an outside investor is
present.
The model also abstracts away from competition, either from other open-source
blockchain-based protocols or traditional companies. Remember that, in the model,
users enjoy the full surplus generated by the protocol. Hence, a competing open-
source blockchain-based protocol (or a traditional company) can attract users only if
it can generate a higher surplus, either by providing a better technological solution
or by attracting a larger user base. This could affect the timing of the ICO. If
there are “winner takes all” dynamics and network effects, it is conceivable that the
developer will want to anticipate the ICO, so as to build a sufficiently large user base
and prevent the entrance of competitors. However, assuming that the source code is
disclosed at ICO, holding an ICO earlier also gives the opportunity for competitors
to copy the code and imitate some features. The full treatment of asymmetry of
both information and competition is also left for future work.
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A Mathematical appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. In the text I show that if U˜T (QT ) is strictly increasing and
convex, strictly so for some QT . Therefore, in equilibrium, in period T − 1 the
developer is indifferent between selling all of his tokens or keeping all of his tokens.
It follows that I can write:
U˜T−1(QT−1) = max
eT−1,iT−1,eT ,iT
{
−iT−1 − e
2
T−1
2
− iT − e
2
T
2
+Qt−1 · pT
}
,
that is, I can write the utility in period T − 1 assuming that the developer sells
all of his tokens in period T . Again, because effort and investment affect pT , then
U˜T−1(QT−1) is strictly increasing and convex (strictly so somewhere). Again, in
equilibrium, in period T − 2 the developer is indifferent between selling all of his
tokens or keeping all of his tokens. Therefore, I can write:
U˜T−2(QT−2) = max
eT−2,iT−2,eT−1,iT−1,eT ,iT
{
−iT−2 − e
2
T−2
2
− iT−1 − e
2
T−1
2
− iT − e
2
T
2
+Qt−1 · pT
}
,
which is strictly increasing and convex (strictly so somewhere). Repeating the same
argument implies that all U˜t(Qt) are strictly increasing and convex (strictly so some-
where), and therefore in every period the only possible equilibrium is one in which
the developer is indifferent between selling all of his tokens or purchasing all tokens.
All U˜t(Qt) can be written as:
U˜t(Qt) = max
et,it,et+1,it+1,...,eT ,iT
{
−
T∑
s=t
is −
T∑
s=t
e2s
2
+Qt−1 · pT
}
,
which implies that, in every period, optimal effort and investment are again given
by (2) and (3).
Furthermore, for the agent to be indifferent, in every period the price must be
pt =
U˜t+1(M)
M
. Writing the utility function in period t+1 as above, and using optimal
effort and investment, we get:
pt =
Vt + (T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
. (15)
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It follows that if Qt = M , then:
pt =
Vt−1 + (T − t+ 1)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
,
if instead Qt = 0, then:
pt =
Vt−1 + (T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
.
Call αt−1 the probability that in period t − 1 the developer sells all of his tokens.
Because investors must be willing to hold tokens between the two periods, it must
be that:
pt−1 =
Vt−1 + (T − t+ 1)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t+ 1)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
=
αt−1
(
Vt−1 + (T − t)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
)
+
(1− αt−1)
(
Vt−1 + (T − t+ 1)f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
(1− γ)M − (T − t)
e∗(M)2/2 + i∗(M)
M
)
.
Solving for αt−1 yields:
αt−1 = (1− γ) (e
∗(M))2/2 + i∗(M)
f(e∗(M), i∗(M))
.
Finally, the above expression can be used to further simplify (15) and achieve (6).
Proof of Lemma 2. As discussed in the text, the choice of QT maximizes the con-
tinuation value:
UT (QT , AT−1 + (M −QT ) · p∗T − iT−1),
where p∗T ∈ p(QT ) depends on which equilibrium is expected to emerge in period
T . The important observation is that QT determines the assets available in the
following period. Therefore, by Lemma 1, the continuation value is strictly convex
in QT for:
Qˆ ≤ QT ≤ QT−1 − iT−1 + i− AT−1
pT
,
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and is linearly increasing in QT otherwise, with a downward discontinuity at M −
iT−1+i−AT−1
pT
, given by the minimum number of tokens that the developer needs to
sell in order to achieve i in period T . See Figure 4 for a graphical representation.
QT
UT (QT , AT−1 + (M −QT ) · pT − iT−1)
M − iT−1+i−AT−1
pTQˆ M
Fig. 4: Continuation value as a function of QT .
Suppose that the “high” equilibrium is expected to emerge, so that pT = max{p(QT )}.
The discontinuity is at:
Q˜′T ≡ QT :
i+ iT−1 − AT−1
M −QT =
VT−1 + g(e∗(QT ))
(1− γ)M ,
generating a continuation utility:
VT−1 + g(e∗(min{Q˜′T ,M}))
(1− γ)M M −
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′T ,M}))2.
If the “low” equilibrium is expected to emerge, then the discontinuity is at:
Q˜′′T = M −
(
i+ iT−1 − AT−1
)
(1− γ)M
f(eT−2, iT−2) + f(eT−1, iT−1)
,
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generating a continuation utility:
VT−1 + g(e∗(min{Q˜′′T ,M}))
(1− γ)M M −
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′′T ,M}))2.
Because period T effort is chosen optimally, it must be that:
g(e∗(min{Q˜′T ,M}))
(1− γ)M M ≥
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′T ,M}))2,
and:
g(e∗(min{Q˜′′T ,M}))
(1− γ)M M ≥
1
2
(e∗(min{Q˜′′T ,M}))2,
which implies that the two continuation utilities (the one with threshold Q˜′T and the
one with threshold Q˜′′T ) are greater than the continuation utility when the developer
holds QT = M and no investment occurs:
VT−1
(1− γ)MM.
Hence, holding either Q˜′T or Qˆ′′T is preferred to holding the entire stock of tokens M
and not investing. The continuation utility is therefore maximized at either Q˜′T or
Qˆ′′T , depending on what equilibrium is expected to emerge in period T .
Proof of Lemma 3. Remember that Q∗T is the largest possible QT such that the
period-T constraint is not binding. It follows that, as already discussed, if Q∗T ≤ Qˆ
then the continuation value is linear in QT because there is no QT for which the
developer will exert effort in period T .
If instead Q∗T > Qˆ then the continuation value is somewhere strictly convex in QT
for QT ≤ Q∗T . In this case, there is the same anti-coordination problem discussed for
the “rich developer” case and the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The developer
must be indifferent between QT = 0 and Q∗T .
The price at which the developer is indifferent is:
pT−1 =
UT (Q
∗
T , AT−1 + (QT−1 −Q∗T ) · pT−1 − iT−1)
Q∗T
=
Q∗T
(
VT−1+g(e∗(Q∗T ,i)
(1−γ)M
)
− 12(e∗(Q∗T , i)2 − i
Q∗T
.
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Furthermore, investors must be indifferent between holding tokens in period T
and in period T − 1, which implies that:
pT−1 =
VT−1 + (1− αT−1)g(e∗(Q∗T , i))
(1− γ)M ,
where αT−1 is the probability that the developer sells all his tokens in period T − 1.
Combining the above two expressions and solving for αT−1 yield the expression in
the proposition.
For existence and (sometimes) uniqueness of the equilibrium, without loss of gen-
erality, assume that whenever Q∗ ≤ Qˆ the agent randomizes between max{Q∗T ,M}
and 0. In case the developer holds a positive amount of tokens, this amount can be
written as a function of pT−1:
Q(p) ≡
min
{
QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1p ,M
}
if QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1p > 0
0 otherwise.
The above expression is increasing whenever AT−1 − iT−1 ≤ i (that is, when the
developer needs to sell some tokens in period T−1 to invest iT = i), and is decreasing
otherwise.
Similarly, call p(Q) the equilibrium pT−1 as a function of the number of tokens
held by the developer in case he holds a positive number of tokens. I distinguish
between two cases. Whenever AT−1 − iT−1 < i (that is, whenever the developer
needs to sell some tokens in period T − 1 to invest iT = i), we have:
p(Q) ≡ VT−1
(1− γ)M+

0 if either Q ≤ Qˆ or Q > QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1
(1−γ)M
(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M if Qˆ ≤ Q ≤ QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
,
where:
α(Q) ≡
(
1
2
(e∗(Q, i∗(Q,AT )))2 + i∗(Q,AT )
)(
Q · g(e
∗(Q, i∗(Q,AT )))
(1− γ)M
)−1
.
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Because:
QT−1 − iT−1 + i− AT−1VT−1
(1−γ)M
< QT−1 − iT−1 + i− AT−1VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
,
for all Q, the case AT−1 − iT−1 < i can be split into three subcases:
1. Whenever QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1
(1−γ)M
> Qˆ then for some Q we have:
p(Q) =
{
VT−1
(1− γ)M ,
VT−1 + (1− α(Q))g(e∗(Q, i))
(1− γ)M
}
.
That is, there are situations in which for given Q∗T , if pT−1 is low the developer
will not have enough funds to finance investment in period T , and therefore
no development will occur. If instead pT−1 is high, there is a positive proba-
bility that the developer will invest and exert effort in period T . Again, this
situation can be seen as a coordination problem among investors. For given
action taken by the developer in period T − 1, investors can coordinate on a
“high” equilibrium that leads to effort and investment in period T with positive
probability, or a “low” equilibrium leading to no development in period T .
2. Whenever QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1+(1−α(M))g(e∗(M))
(1−γ)M
≤ Qˆ, then there is no development in
period T and p(Q) = VT−1
(1−γ)M for all Q.
3. In all other cases, p(Q) is a function, which is equal to VT−1
(1−γ)M for Q ≤ Qˆ
and to VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e
∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M otherwise. This function is continuous because,
by definition of Qˆ, we have e∗(Q, i)) = 0.
Instead, whenever AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i (that is, whenever the developer has enough
own funds to invest iT = i), then period T investment does not depend on pT−1 and
therefore:
p(Q) ≡ VT−1
(1− γ)M +
0 if either Q ≤ Qˆ(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M otherwise,
which is a continuous function.
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An important observation is that p(Q) is strictly increasing whenever Q is such
that positive development is expected with some probability in period T , and is
constant otherwise. To see this, use the definition of α(Q) to write:
Q · g(e
∗(Q, i))
(1− γ)M −
1
2
(e∗(Q, i))2 − i = (1− α(Q))Q · g(e
∗(Q, i))
(1− γ)M . (16)
The LHS of (16) is equal to:
max
e
{
Q · g(e, i)
(1− γ)M −
1
2
e2
}
,
which is strictly increasing and strictly convex in Q. It follows that the RHS of (16)
must also be strictly increasing and strictly convex in Q. This, in turn, implies that
p(Q) is strictly increasing whenever Q is such that positive development is expected
with some probability in period T , and is constant otherwise.
The equilibrium of the game is a p∗ such that p∗ = p(Q(p∗)) and a Q∗ = Q(p∗).
Figure 5 represents all possible cases. Whenever both p(Q) and Q(p) are continuous
functions (when AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i, and when AT−1 − iT−1 < i cases 2 and 3), the
existence of the equilibrium is readily established. It is enough to note that the
range of p(Q) is a closed interval. Call this interval [a, b]. The equilibrium is the
fixed point of the continuous function p(Q(p)) defined over [a, b]. Brower’s fixed
point theorem applies and the fixed point exists.
Whenever p(Q) is a correspondence (AT−1 − iT−1 < i, case 1) we know that for
Qˆ ≤ Q ≤ QT−1 − iT−1+i−AT−1VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M
we have that VT−1+(1−α(Q))g(e
∗(Q,i))
(1−γ)M ∈ p(Q).
Define the threshold value of Q:
Q˜ ≡ QT−1 − iT−1 + i− AT−1
VT−1+(1−α(Q˜))g(e∗(Q˜,i))
(1−γ)M
,
and similarly the corresponding price:
p˜ ≡ VT−1 + (1− α(Q˜))g(e
∗(Q˜, i))
(1− γ)M ∈ p(Q).
By definition of Q(p) we have that Q˜ = Q(p˜), which implies that {Q˜, p˜} is an
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equilibrium.
As already discussed p(Q) is weakly increasing. In case AT−1 − iT−1 ≥ i, Q(p)
is strictly decreasing, and the equilibrium is unique. The equilibrium is unique also
when AT−1 − iT−1 < i case 2, because p(Q) is constant and Q(p) is increasing. In
all other cases multiple equilibria are possible.
p
Q
Q(p)
Qˆ M
Q∗
iT−1+i−AT−1
Qˆ−QT−1
VT−1
(1−γ)M
p(Q)
p∗
(a) AT−1 − iT−1 < i; case 1
p
Q
Q(p)
Qˆ M
p∗ = VT−1
(1−γ)M p(Q)
(b) AT−1 − iT−1 ≤ i; case 2
p
Q
Q(p)
Qˆ M
Q∗TQ
∗
T−2
iT−1+i−AT−1
Qˆ−QT−1
p∗T−2 =
VT−1
(1−γ)M
p(Q)
p∗T−1
Q∗T−1
p∗T
(c) AT−1 − iT−1 ≤ i; case 3
p
Q
Qˆ M
Q∗
VT−1
(1−γ)M
p(Q)
Q(p)
p∗
Q∗
(d) AT−1 − iT−1 > i
Fig. 5: Equilibrium in T − 1
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